Are we living in the middle of an Industrial Revolution? by Joel Mokyr




 am an economic historian, part economist
and part historian. To some, economists are
funny. Historians do not appear to be as
funny as economists. But at times one can find
a good characterization of what historians do. A
good metaphor of what economic history is
about is contained in a nice anecdote I read not
long ago about a tour guide in the Metropolitan
Museum of Art, where a group of visitors was
shown one of the famous but idealized pictures
of George Washington made by Gilbert Stuart.
A skeptical member of the group remarked that
surely this picture bore but little resemblance to
the  real Washington. “Well,” said the guide,
“maybe that is not what he looked like then, but
that surely is what he looks like now.” This in a
nutshell is what historians do: they interpret the
past, but when doing so both the questions asked
and the way the answers are provided are tainted
with a certain measure of “now-ism.” That is,
they formulate questions that are of interest to
them, and as they are children of their own time,
their interests are inevitably conditioned by the
world they live in. There is nothing wrong with
that, as long as we do not force inappropriate
mechanical inferences from analogies in the
style of “this is the way it was then, so what we
can expect now is . . . .”
Each society, then, writes most fondly about
historical phenomena with which it is most
familiar, and technological progress clearly is
dominating our lives as much as it has ever done.
The concept of an Industrial Revolution has
recently become of great interest to general econo-
mists of all persuasions. The New Growth
Theory has placed renewed emphasis on the
importance of technological change in modern
economic growth, and a number of publications
have in recent years tried to look at the Industrial
Revolution from the point of view of the new
growth theory, examining and reexamining the
somewhat-questionable time series we have for
this period to the point of beating them to death
(Brezis and others; Crafts; Greasley and Oxley;
Greenwood and Yorukoglu). Rank and file eco-
nomic historians such as myself who have been
laboring in the trenches for decades trying to
make some sense out of the historical data we
have for the period are rejoicing in our sudden
popularity among our fellow economists. It is
therefore tempting to look at the events of our
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City or the Federal Reserve System.own time as analogous to those of the British
Industrial Revolution since it adds legitimiza-
tion to the research we were already doing any-
way. But the temptation to look at the past to
guide us in making predictions and policy
recommendations should be resisted. Historical
analogies often mislead as much as they instruct
and in technological progress, where change is
unpredictable, cumulative, and irreversible, the
analogies are more dangerous than anywhere.
The British Industrial Revolution
The British Industrial Revolution in its “clas-
sical period” was, by and large, a small and
localized affair, confined to a few regions in the
northwest of England and the Scottish lowlands.
As late as 1830, one could travel through the vast
part of Britain and never see a factory chimney.
The modern sector, as we may call it, employed
perhaps 10 percent of the labor force. The largest
sectors such as construction, services, agricul-
ture, and most of manufacturing were operating
more or less in the same technological paradigm
as a century before. By the middle of the century,
the small workshop, where the independent
artisan labored with his sons and apprentices,
was still far more common than the large cotton
mill. Consequently, the productivity gains and
the increase in real wages and the standard of
living occurred late, by the reckoning of some
not until the mid-1840s, two generations after the
first great breakthroughs occurred (Mokyr 1993).
In our century, everything happens faster. But,
adjusting for scale, are the phenomena compa-
rable? For one thing, despite the fact that the
British Industrial Revolution in the 18th century
was limited to a small part of the economy, it
was not limited to a single industry or even a
handful. As one author once put it, “It was not
the age of cotton, nor the age of steam, nor the
age of iron—it was the age of progress.” Recent
research by Peter Temin confirms this; Temin
has shown that in addition to the great industries
such as cotton and iron, Britain maintained tech-
nological superiority in a vast array of minor
industries from the linen and rope industries to
the manufacture of toys, belts, buttons, paper,
and pins. Many of these advances can be discov-
ered if you just dig deep enough into an obscure
literature few venture into. 
Consider one simple example: writing. The
old, venerable quill pen, despite its virtues, suf-
fered from many defects such as uneven writing
and the need to dip frequently into ink. The steel
pen, with two slits pierced in the shoulder of the
nib, gave the pen both flexibility and the capa-
bility to retain ink. It was perfected in the 1820s.
By the middle of the century it was univer-
sal—it would be speculative but not absurd to
suggest that without this modest improvement
Anthony Trollope would not have been able to
sustain his declared rule of completing 250 words
every 15 minutes (Day). Mass production and
interchangeable parts, too, made their entrance
upon the British scene, American claims of pri-
ority notwithstanding. The Portsmouth shipyard
in 1801 mass-produced interchangeable wooden
gears and pulleys for the British navy using
sophisticated control techniques and a highly
specialized labor force. Run by two of the most
brilliant engineers of the time, Marc Brunel and
Henry Maudslay, it was truly Fordism before
Ford (Cooper).
There were other technological break-
throughs, many of them in unexpected corners
of the economy: during those years the human
race broke the tyranny of gravity by flying the
first balloons; broke the tyranny of smallpox by
introducing the first truly successful vaccina-
tion process; broke the tyranny of darkness by
bringing the lighting powers of gas to homes
and streets; and broke the tyranny of food-
spoiling bacteria by the introduction of food
canning. There were thus many enclaves of
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remained enclaves. 
The current age
In our time—taken roughly to be the years
from 1950 to the present—we, too, observe that
we are neither the age of the microprocessor, nor
the age of antibiotics, nor the age of the advanced
plastics, but an age in which progress is like a
steady rain, falling in torrents on some places
while only drizzling elsewhere, but widespread
if not ubiquitous. In its celebrated survey on the
world economy published last year, the Econo-
mist magazine explicitly argued that our age
might be compared with the Industrial Revolu-
tion because of the pervasiveness of what it
called IT, information technology. As a “general
purpose” technology, IT shows up almost eve-
rywhere in the economy, although, in Solow’s
well-known quip, everywhere except in the pro-
ductivity data. Without denigrating the impor-
tance of IT, if all we had to show today for our
technological achievements were microproces-
sors and the information storage and communi-
cations that go with them, we would not deserve
the term. I submit that it is exactly the host of
other advances across a huge spectrum that
justify more encompassing terms like the Indus-
trial Revolution. 
The number of major breakthroughs alone,
however, is by itself not an adequate criterion to
qualify for Industrial Revolution status. What
must matter, above all, is the impact that such
technological advances have on the economy.
The problem is that normally such effects can
only be assessed much later. The steam engine,
to choose a famous example of a general pur-
pose technology, made its first appearance in
1709 but its impact on the economy before 1830
was not all that enormous, in part because it still
needed to be refined and improved, and in part
because good alternatives were available. After
1830, with its widespread application to trans-
portation and to manufacturing in areas where
water power was unavailable, the steam engine’s
economic importance increased. Perhaps most
crucially, the steam engine led further down
the road to the development of other engines
and played a major role in the development of
thermodynamics. And yet, had there only been
the steam engine, the Industrial Revolution
would have been just like the 15th century: an
era of isolated breakthroughs that eventually
petered out.
Judging technological breakthroughs
There are different ways to judge technologi-
cal breakthroughs; the obvious one and most
appealing to economists is the impact on output
and productivity. But there are others: I like the
notion that pathbreaking inventions allow us to
do something previously impossible such as fly-
ing or preventing infectious disease. One can
judge an era of technological advances by
whether it is one of door-opening or gap-filling
inventions. It could be argued that if the criterion
for an Industrial Revolution is a cluster of such
macroinventions, this does qualify our own age
as much as the classical British Industrial Revo-
lution, but so does the period roughly between
1860 and 1900 (Mokyr 1991). 
It is important to emphasize how different the
basic processes of innovation are today from
what they were then. For one thing, technology
in the 18th century still consisted of largely
independently optimized components (Ten-
ner).
1 If you could make a better dye or build a
better water mill, you did so. Today most of our
technology is constrained by network depen-
dencies. This is not only true for obvious cases
like communications, computing, and power
supply, but also in the supply of parts and com-
plements such as batteries and film. Standard-
ization is required by consumers expecting it
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innovation far more difficult since compatibility
conditions have to be satisfied. Innovation as a
coordination game starts in earnest after the
Industrial Revolution with the development of
railroads and the telegraph in the 1830s. It
altered the innovation process in many funda-
mental ways. 
Secondly, research and development in the
18th century were quite different. Firms rarely
did any conscious in-house research. Much of it
was carried out by brilliant amateurs or profes-
sional inventors, some famous like Watt,
Roberts, or Bessemer, and many known only to
the specialists who study them. The process of
productivity growth depended, as it always
does, on the thousands of small and anonymous
improvements introduced by workmen on the
shop floor. 
But there is a deeper difference: technological
progress in the 18th century was essentially
empirical and nonscience based. That is not to
say that there were no connections between sci-
ence and industry during the Industrial Revolu-
tion—scholars have devoted their lives to
studying those. The technological advances that
counted most, however, were not based on a
deep understanding of the physical or chemical
principles involved; this does not mean that they
did not work, of course. It does mean, however,
that further progress was often painstakingly
slow; it also means that the process of invention
was often very inefficient. Simply put, if you
know what things work, but you do not know
why, you will not know what does not work, and
you end up going into far more blind alleys than
you would have otherwise. It also makes the
timing far more difficult to understand; many of
the inventions made during the Industrial Revo-
lution could have been made much earlier or
much later, it is just a matter of when the right
person happened to walk into the right alley.
Most important, understanding the underlying
scientific principles allows one to adapt tech-
niques to changing circumstances. Cast iron
could be turned easily into bar iron following
Cort’s great invention of 1784, but before the
basic principles of iron metallurgy were worked
out in the second half of the 19th century, the
finely tuned alloys we rely upon now were not
available.
Technological progress in our own age is
quite different. It may be seriously questioned
whether we fully understand the natural pro-
cesses we control, and serendipity still plays a
bigger role than we care to acknowledge, but
surely we have a much better grip on the under-
lying principles—indeed in a host of areas from
nuclear power to magnetic resonance imaging it
is impossible to see how one would have arrived
there at all without knowing the science. Need-
less to say, we still develop and employ tech-
niques for which the underlying principles are
not even remotely understood (such as acupunc-
ture) or which may be as bogus as the phlogiston
theory on which physics relied before Lavoisier
(such as Freudian psychiatry or the prediction of
aggregate economic time series), but in the more
down-to-earth matters we associate with pro-
duction technology we are in far better shape
than our forefathers were in the 1780s. For that
reason, it seems unlikely that the pattern of
technological development during our own In-
dustrial Revolution will look even remotely like
its predecessors. 
Technological change: scale of
production
There are a number of other interesting char-
acteristics that need to be addressed if we are to
make this comparison meaningful. Consider
the microeconomic implications of technologi-
cal change on the structure of the unit of pro-
duction. The Industrial Revolution in Britain
34 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYwas not just the time of the “rise of the factory,”
it was the period in which the firm as a unit of
production was born. Before about 1,800 firms,
or “houses” as they were usually called, were
usually commercial or financial in nature, and
actual production normally took place in peo-
ple’s homes. 
With very few exceptions, the sharp distinction
between the firm and the household in manufac-
turing did not exist before, say, 1750. Firms
might consist of merchants who put work out to
domestic producers, or skilled artisans working
from their own workshops who sold their goods
in markets or little stores. The idea of placing all
workers together in a single site became only
popular during the Industrial Revolution. The
social constructivist view that this was a capital-
ist plot to squeeze a larger surplus out of the
workers notwithstanding, it seems hard to believe
that the idea of a factory or “mill” in the terms
of the day was not in large part technologically
induced. Economies of scale at the plant level
become prominent with a centralized power sup-
ply, with a decline in transportation costs, and
with the appearance of such novelties as gaslight-
ing which makes longer work hours in the short
winter days of northern England and Scotland
possible (Landes). Modern scholars have added
to that an analysis of information costs, the
growing need for standardized products and qual-
ity control in larger and anonymous markets, the
need to retrain workers in an age of rapidly
changing technology, and so on. 
A real Industrial Revolution consists not just
of technological innovations but of such inno-
vations that make an impact at the level of
industrial organization. They shift cost curves
not only by lowering them but by changing the
optimal firm scale. The so-called second Indus-
trial Revolution, traditionally dated between
1860 and 1890 or so, reinforced this trend by
creating the vast steel and chemical plants and
the giant corporations celebrated by Alfred
Chandler and his students. At the same time,
however, it created universal electric power,
which removed at least one source of economies
of scale. Our own age, it seems, is on the verge
of once more changing the way production takes
place. The growing trends of telecommuting and
outsourcing seem to suggest that at least in some
industries the 200-year-old trend toward the
growing concentration of workers under one
roof in a rigid time schedule and under strict
discipline is about to be reversed. We may be
seeing just the beginning of it, and most people
still have to show up in the office or on the shop
floor at 8:30 in the morning, but each year fewer
do. To put it as provocatively as I can, the Industrial
Revolution began the separation between home
and workplace; our own time may be witnessing
the beginning of the movement in reverse.
Technological change: skills, human
capital, and distribution of income
Closely related to the micro-issue of produc-
tion scale is the question of skills, human capital,
and the distribution of income. It is often argued
that in our own time, skilled labor is more
complementary to investment embodying new
technology than unskilled labor, and so capital
accumulation and technological change favor
skilled over unskilled labor. While Marx and
the people inspired by him thought that the
Industrial Revolution was essentially de-skilling,
more recent work by Williamson has turned this
argument squarely on its head and claimed that
the demand for skills lagged behind the supply
before 1850 (Williamson). 
Perhaps it should be added that “skills” do not
fully capture what early 19th century employers
needed: the factory labor needed to be docile,
placid, and punctual. Skills may have mattered
less for many of the jobs before 1870. In a recent,
highly original and imaginative paper entitled
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and Mehmet Yorukoglu, pointed out that the
sharpening of income distribution inequality in
the past two decades mirrors events during the
British Industrial Revolution. They hypothesize
that rapid technological change favors workers
with high skill levels who can better adapt to
the early stages of innovative cycles. Later on,
when the new technology becomes more user-
friendly, the demand for unskilled workers—
possibly living abroad—rises. 
Without necessarily buying into the details of
this theory, we all know about the so-called
Kuznets curve which postulates that early on in
the process of growth income distribution be-
comes more unequal, then becomes more equal
at a later stage. Whether this phenomenon aptly
describes what happened during the British
Industrial Revolution is still a matter of serious
controversy among specialists (Feinstein). The
available data, sad to say, are not as good as the
modern statistics indicating a rather obvious
trend toward rising inequality in U.S. and UK
data for the last quarter century (much less so,
incidentally, anywhere else). We therefore do
not know precisely what happened to income
distribution during the Industrial Revolution;
what we do know is that the standard of living
of the laboring class as measured by real wages
shows very little improvement until the mid-
1840s. As the income from capital and especially
land increased sharply, this may seem as indirect
support for a Kuznets curve.
Many may immediately see a parallel here, but
again I must warn you against jumping to rash
conclusions. Much of the slowness of British
real wages to respond to technological change
was undoubtedly due to the rapid natural growth
of population and the increase of the labor sup-
ply in Britain due to migration. While factor
mobility—broadly defined as the migration of
capital to labor as well as the reverse—in our
own days is often regarded as an explanation of
the slow increase in real wages, the industrialized
West does not experience much natural increase
in population. In addition, living standards
during the Industrial Revolution were suppressed
by some fortuitous events such as harvest fail-
ures and wars. Even more disturbing to the
comparison is the notion that in fact real wages
are mismeasured and that there is a Boskin bias
(I prefer to call it a Gordon bias) in the deflator
used to calculate it. Nothing like the unprece-
dented increase in the quality and variety of
consumer goods can be observed in Britain dur-
ing the Industrial Revolution. The working class
still spent most of its income on food, drink, and
housing. They did buy some cotton clothes and
ironwares manufactured by a new technology,
but few would doubt that in its first 60 years or
so the Industrial Revolution favored investment
good prices over consumer good prices.
One interesting debate that always seems to
arise during periods of intense technological
progress is its effect on labor demand and the
possibilities of technological unemployment. Do
machines throw people out of work, and if so, is
sustained technological change desirable at all?
In a recent book named The End of Work, noted
technophobe and economic troglodyte Jeremy
Rifkin maintained that the Luddites were right
and that sustained innovation eliminates jobs.
Most economists tend to disagree heartily, both
on theoretical and empirical grounds. Danny
Blanchflower and Simon Burgess, in a recent
paper, have concluded flatly that for our own
time “job growth and the introduction of new
technology appear to be complements rather
than substitutes. The Luddites were wrong.” 
Wrong or not, the debate on what became
known as “the Machinery Question” was even
more active in the 1820s than it is now, in part
due to the famous chapter that Ricardo inserted
into his Principles in the third edition. In his
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showed how such unemployment could occur.
Few of us would doubt that one can write a
model in which technological progress could
reduce the demand for labor. But “could” does
not mean “did.” There simply is not a grain of
evidence for sustained, long-term periods of
involuntary unemployment in 19th century Brit-
ain. While exact figures are not available, it is
telling that hundreds of thousands of people
emigrated from a country where there was little
or no technological progress (Ireland) to one in
which there was a lot. Again, the parallel with
the experience of our time is suggestive perhaps,
but not much more than that.
Technological change: globalization
One of the more hackneyed debates of our
own time involves the effect of technological
change on the “g-word,” by now so overused as
to be practically devoid of any meaning: globali-
zation. If the meaning of globalization is the
intensification of international trade and the
mobility of labor, capital, and technology, it
must be stressed that the first Industrial Revolu-
tion was not accompanied by a significant in-
crease in worldwide trade relative to total
output. The reason for that was largely fortui-
tous: the critical years of the first Industrial
Revolution were accompanied by continuous
warfare, including a quarter of a century of what
might well be called World War Zero, the pro-
longed conflict between Britain and France that
encompassed the world from the Cape of Good
Hope to Cape Cod. Between 1793 and 1815, war
disrupted the growth of trade, a point even noted
by Ricardo. 
In the years following Waterloo, what we call
today globalization was inhibited by strongly
protectionist policies and even laws that prohib-
ited the export of machinery and the emigration
of skilled engineers out of England. All this
started to change in the 1830s with the fall in
transport and communications costs and the emer-
gence of free trade and internationally integrated
factor markets. Indeed, the next 70 years were
such that the Economist has noted that by some
measures, the world in 1914 was more integrated
than in the 1990s and that railways, steamships,
and the telegraph were far more revolutionary
than satellite links, the Internet, and other cur-
rent wizardy. It then added that “what is different
is that globalization in the 19th century was
driven mainly by transport costs, whereas now
it is being driven by plunging communication
costs which make much deeper international
integration possible.” 
That is a neat statement, but I am not totally
sure it is accurate. For one thing, the statement
ignores the huge improvements in communica-
tions in the 19th century due to the telegraph,
which for the first time allowed information to
travel at a rate faster than people, ignoring only
smoke signals and homing pigeons. Postal ser-
vices, though they had existed before, were re-
organized and internationally coordinated in the
19th century. The penny post, invented by Row-
land Hill in the 1840s, did an enormous amount
for communications—compared with what was
before. Its marginal contribution was certainly
not less than Netscape’s. More important, with
the rise of literacy, people discovered reading as
a means of communications. Newspapers, lend-
ing libraries, cheap books, and magazines were
all popularized in the 19th century. Hal Varian,
who has emphasized the importance of the emer-
gence of reading as an information revolution,
ranks this development right beside the Internet
in importance.
Moreover, even if the premise to the statement
is true, I have yet to be persuaded that these
improved communications have a very high
direct marginal product. The Economist surely
is right when it points out that never in history
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declined so precipitously. But that observation’s
relevance is proportional to the marginal prod-
uct of that input. For the time being, I suspect,
better communications and cheaper information
have more value in increasing consumer sur-
pluses than in actually increasing traditionally
measured output. They allow us to access infor-
mation quickly and efficiently, but this infor-
mation was available before, if somewhat less
conveniently. An e-mail is on average 300 times
faster than an airmail letter, but as editor of a
refereed journal which relies heavily on this
input I can assure you that it does not really
change the job all that much except perhaps by
saving a bit on typing and filing costs. To be sure,
better communications and information do save
resources on a wide array of fronts, from just-
in-time inventories to the decline of commuting,
but the paperless office has not yet materialized,
and anyone who uses the Internet will be hard-
pressed to decide whether it saves more time
than it gobbles up. 
Of course, we have access now to a much
larger supply of information, but here we must
always keep in mind that the human mind can
process at most 50 bytes per second—and most
of us probably do not do nearly as well. Few if
any persons in our age, I venture, suffer from a
lack of information—we all have stacks of
unread papers, unanswered e-mail messages,
endlessly unopened Internet pages, memos that
are still in their brown campus envelopes, video-
tapes of Public TV programs which we promise
ourselves to watch “when there is time.” The
high priority is no longer in getting the informa-
tion to us but in selecting and ranking, sorting
the duplicative and the false and the irrelevant
from the information that we need. Like DNA,
most of the information is junk. 
As I noted earlier, if the communications revo-
lution is going to have an impact beyond the
conveniences of e-mail, on-line reference books,
catalog ordering from home, and the wasting of
time through Internet surfing, it will be in return-
ing to the home as the location of a lot of
production. What the precise effect of such a
revolution would be on GDP remains to be
seen—I suspect we need to revise how we mea-
sure it before we will ever know. Economists
have pointed out that, for instance, electronic
airline ticketing saves time, but a flight from A
to B still takes almost as long as 25 years ago
and the journey probably more because of
security checks and congested traffic to air-
ports. It matters more only insofar as it substi-
tutes some form of very efficient communication
such as videoconferencing for airline travel, and
on the margins that may be happening, though
academics and researchers still show an affin-
ity to go to conferences and meet each other
rather than reading our papers and talks over the
Internet.
Modern growth theory
A different argument concerns the question of
exogenous versus endogenous growth. Modern
growth theory has tended to attribute a much
larger portion of economic growth to endogenous
factors. The sense of economists is that they
prefer models that do not rely on unexplained
and exogenous changes, replacing them, as one
recent paper has it, “with explanations of histori-
cal experience” (Greasley and Oxley; Crafts and
Mills). Endogenous growth theory argues that
technological progress is really produced by the
system, either by people getting better skills and
education or by some capital good that brings
it about. This view implies, as everyone here
surely knows, that the time series properties of
industrial output will be quite different than the
old exogenous growth models in which eco-
nomic growth triggered by exogenous techno-
logical shocks eventually reverted back to a
steady-state rate. In these models the output
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that is, it does not possess a unit root. 
An interesting debate has developed in the
pages of the periodical literature on whether the
time series of industrial output in Britain between
1780 and 1914 exhibits a unit root, the argument
being that trend versus difference stationarity
presents a strong test of the kind of process that
generates economic growth. The idea is that if
the series can be shown to be difference station-
ary, economic growth will be “endogenous”
because a production function of the Romer-
type exhibits persistence and does not revert
back to its trend.
The econometric argument, thus far, is incon-
clusive. Nicholas Crafts has argued that at least
some part of the growth was exogenous and
that trend stationarity cannot be rejected. Others
have reexamined their data and concluded the
reverse. One problem—revealing my historian’s
roots—is that too much ink is spilled on devising
the right test for persistence and too little, some
would say none at all, attention to the underlying
data. For a wide range of goods the quantity
indices used by all participants in the debate
consistently understate the rate of growth and so
tend to be biased. It is not clear to me whether
such a bias would increase or decrease the like-
lihood of rejecting the unit root hypothesis, but
it does mean that many of the tests have been
run on flawed data. While a few products such
as cotton and coal are thought to be of more or
less uniform quality, improvement in the quality
and nature of capital goods, from steam engines
to cattle to street lights, makes the series com-
piled by Crafts and others a source of concern.
Performing a conclusive unit root test on consis-
tently measured output data is difficult enough,
as my colleagues Christiano and Eichenbaum
pointed out years ago—doing so with output
data which are not and could not be measured in
a consistent way strikes me as demanding too
much credulity-suspension (Christiano and oth-
ers; McCallum). To be sure, one can do such
analyses on disaggregated series, and here too
there is some evidence of persistence. Either
way, in this game an ounce of data is better than
a pound of econometric technique. 
Moreover, exact economic meaning of such
persistence is still rather unclear. It means that a
sudden technological “shock” due to an inven-
tion of sorts will disturb the rate of growth of
output forever, which is what one would expect
if the production function exhibited increasing
returns. But what if technology is itself a
Markov process in which present values depend
on the past? In that case what looks like output
responding forever to a sudden technology
shock is nothing but output responding to new
knowledge building on itself. The point I am
trying to make here is a deeper one than just a
technical critique: It is that beneath the changes
in technology there are changes in human
knowledge not readily observed in time series.
That knowledge does not have to be scientific,
as I argued it was not. But there was an accu-
mulation of experience, of tricks, of practical
engineering knowledge of “what works,” “what
material is suitable,” and “what tool is appropri-
ate here.” We know, more or less, how this
knowledge was transmitted, diffused, improved
upon, and eventually discarded. Very little of it
had anything to do with formal schooling, least
of all in Britain. 
While new growth theorists regard knowledge
creation as “endogenous” and thus demanding
explanation, I doubt whether just trying to
approximate them as human capital, education,
schooling, or any of those proxies will do the
job. The knowledge we are talking about was
largely concentrated in the crania of a few thou-
sand of the most brilliant engineers in the British
Isles, men such as Smeaton, Brunel, Watt, Tre-
vithick, Stephenson, and so on. “Exogenous” or
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in their heads. Can we find a proxy variable to
endogenize them? Or should we? How is such
knowledge generated, tested, and chosen? How
do we map the set of this knowledge onto the
domain of useful techniques? The difficulty with
building knowledge into the production func-
tion is transparent; knowledge cannot be quan-
tified or measured readily, but it is also not
subject to any obvious law of diminishing
returns. We should remind ourselves of some-
thing we of course all knew—the explicit inclu-
sion of useful knowledge as an element in
economic growth wreaks havoc on neoclassical
theories, be they old or new. The hard truth is
that the new growth theory, much like the old
growth theory, has tried to write the history of
technological progress without paying much
attention to the economic history of useful hu-
man knowledge. Writing such a history would
be far more challenging and difficult than run-
ning unit root tests or employing Kalman Filters
on cotton output series that have been around for
half a century.
We have only the most rudimentary ideas on
how knowledge changes and technical knowl-
edge is no exception here. What is more, this is
hardly a field in which economists have a com-
parative advantage. New knowledge is not com-
bined with old knowledge in an obvious way. It
does not necessarily add on to old knowledge
nor wholly replace it. It is a system in which
chance and necessity, luck, and intentionality
play a rather complex game, the outcome of
which is neither predictable nor wholly under-
standable. Unlike any other input, knowledge
does not even obey the laws of arithmetic. Tech-
nical knowledge forms some kind of system that
evolves over time, or better yet, coevolves with
other forms of knowledge such as science and
business administration. Changes in it are in
many cases responses to economic stimuli, but
they are above all the results of new ideas and
inspirations occurring to people involved in pro-
duction, extensions, and recombinations of
things they already knew, somehow different
and therefore new.
To say that changes in technological knowl-
edge are “exogenous” does not mean that they
rain down on us like manna from heaven and
that there is no way we will ever be able to
understand them. It only says that in the creation
of new technology the exact process that trans-
forms inputs into outputs is far more complex
than economic science currently can deal with.
Yet we have a variety of attempts to understand
it, from Martin Weitzman’s idea that any new
idea is just a combination of old ideas and so
their number will expand at an ever increasing
rate, to attempts such as my own to use Darwin-
ian selection models in understanding why cer-
tain new techniques were retained and others
rejected (Mokyr 1995).
The alternative approach to test for endogenous
growth is to hammer on the residual. Thus if
endogenous growth is to be confirmed, we need
to specify the correct inputs and the Solow
residual will disappear. Technology is still impor-
tant, but it is no longer identified by the unex-
plained residual, the measure of our ignorance.
Instead it is proxied by new capital, learning,
measures of R&D input, and other nice mea-
sures that economists feel should relate to tech-
nological progress. Correctly identifying human
capital has been important, but the evidence
does not suggest that it bears a one-to-one rela-
tion with technology: we need to know what is
being taught in the schools, how efficient the
teaching is, and how students translate what they
learn to better production techniques. 
Equally important, productivity is often affected
by things learned elsewhere. In that regard, nei-
ther the British Industrial Revolution nor the last
20 years give us much to hang on. The early
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not better educated or schooled than their fore-
fathers a century or two earlier. Insofar that
literacy went up, it seems to have been a conse-
quence rather than a cause. Technical skills were
acquired on the job, through apprenticeship and
experience. The great inventors of the Industrial
Revolution, from Arkwright and Watt down,
learned what skills they possessed as appren-
tices, not something that gets captured by tradi-
tional measures of human capital. Indeed, a priori
reasoning suggests that heavy investment in train-
ing might even be an impediment to sustained
technological progress, because the productive
sector commits to a particular technique, and then
has to “unlearn” it when something else has been
devised to replace it. In an age of rapidly chang-
ing technology, perhaps the best skill that can be
taught is how to learn (and unlearn) quickly,
something that macroeconomists seem unusu-
ally good at. This, however, is hardly what we
mean by standard measures of human capital. 
Technological leadership
Finally, I should like to say something about
the connection of the Industrial Revolution with
the so-called convergence literature. If we go
back for a minute to the new growth theory, it is
readily realized that it implies in its crudest form
a divergence of economic performance. The rea-
son is that Romer models depend on some form
of increasing returns, implying that the rich get
richer and the poor get richer too, perhaps, but
more slowly so. I am not going to discuss the
voluminous literature on convergence here, but
I should like to point out that for one, Great
Britain stands as a grand exception to any such
rule. It is one of the best examples enabling us
to examine a case of long-term convergence (De
Long). During the long reign of Queen Victoria,
Britain was the undisputed economic and tech-
nological leader of the world, the country where
the action was, that other economies observed
and studied and envied and tried to emulate.
Today, its GDP is slightly below Italy’s and
soon it will be surpassed by Ireland’s at current
growth rates. Its leadership is a laughing stock.
I am not sure whether this one observation
proves anything, because other early industrial-
izers in Europe such as Belgium and Switzerland
have experienced quite different fates. It does
serve, in my view, as a good illustration of what
I have called “Cardwell’s Law,” the empirical
regularity that technological leadership tends to
be hard to sustain and normally ephemeral (Mokyr
1994). Mind you, technological leadership is not
the same as GDP or living standards, of course,
and in any event a country may be a leader in
one product and a follower in others. All the
same, the following general observations are
true for Britain for the period between 1760 and
1914, and I am leaving it as an exercise to
compare this with our own time. First, British
technological leadership did not mean that the
major breakthroughs were necessarily achieved
by Britons. In a dozen important cases, the criti-
cal breakthrough was made elsewhere. The Brit-
ish, however, had the capability of adapting,
implementing, and then exploiting novel ideas
wherever they came from. Great imitators make
great inventors, one historian has remarked, and
I think there is an important truth in that obser-
vation. Second, the new industries developed in
Britain during the Industrial Revolution and its
aftermath eventually lost their technological
dynamism, and while they never became com-
pletely ossified, there was just so much you
could do to improve cotton spinning machinery
or steamships. Third, Britain had considerable
difficulty in switching to new industries that
became the technological frontier after 1860.
That is not to say that they failed altogether, but
by 1914 they had lost the edge in chemicals to
Germany, in automobiles to the United States,
and were a distinctive follower in electrical
engineering, mass-produced machinery, and food
ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1997 41processing. What went wrong? And are there
lessons from it?
The main lesson from this tale is that techno-
logical change really is not like any other input.
As I keep stressing, it depends a great deal on
the formation of knowledge behind it. But it also
depends on institutions and political economy.
To put it differently, the decision-making insti-
tutions in each economy create an environment
in which technological progress can either
thrive or wither. It may seem trivial to state that
society ought to be hospitable to new technology
which is a cheap way of increasing economic
welfare, but the historical experience indicates
that few societies have followed this advice. The
amount of resistance against technological pro-
gress that we observe through most of history is
such that at times one wonders how new tech-
nologies emerged at all. To a large extent Britain
became a victim of her own success: the indus-
tries on which she built her success established
certain technological power structures, both
among the firms and among labor unions. These
power structures set up a variety of political and
social barriers after 1880 or so, some of them
obvious and some quite subtle and insidious,
against innovations. These barriers were not
impermeable, and there are instances in which
they were breached. All the same, they became
an effective obstacle. If Britain lost her techno-
logical primacy it is because she continued to
produce ships, cotton, engines, fixtures, and
machines in old-fashioned ways, and because
she was unable until very late to create the kind
of formal education in which engineers and
skilled workers could be taught not only to do
things right but to keep updating such knowl-
edge over their work life.
Let me conclude by reflecting about what we
can and cannot learn from such historical analo-
gies. We certainly can identify periods of rapid
technological change and realize they belong to
a class of historical phenomena. At the same
time we should realize that the classical Indus-
trial Revolution was in many ways a sui generis.
Perhaps that is what future historians will also
say about the 1980s and 1990s. They, too, how-
ever, are likely to write history in their own
image conditional on their own present—and
who can say what that will look like? As it says
in the Talmud, “Ever since our second Temple
was destroyed, the art of prophesy was given to
the fools”—surely a wisdom not wasted on a
meeting of macroeconomists.
ENDNOTES
1 See for instance Edward Tenner. There are a few
exceptions to this rule: Open field agriculture was clearly
a complex system in which individual components such as
crop choice could not be optimized independently of the 
whole. The same is true for the sailing ships, a complex
entity in which rigging, masting, hull, and steering all
depended on each other and jointly determined the
parameters of the vessel.
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